Proof and Consequence is a rigorous, elegant introduction to classical first-order natural deductive logic; it provides an accurate and accessible first course in the study of formal systems. The text covers all the topics necessary for learning logic at the beginner and intermediate levels: this includes propositional and quantificational logic (using Suppes-style proofs) and extensive metatheory, as well as over 800 exercises. Proof and Consequence provides exclusive access to the software application Simon, an easily downloadable program designed to facilitate an (...) intuitive understanding of classical logic through the generation and analysis of proofs. It also aids with the representation of natural language sentences in the formal language. Equipped with nearly all the exercises found in the text, Simon helps students work efficiently and effectively by detecting and explaining errors in solutions as they proceed. Students can also submit assignments, view their own records, and check their standing in the class. The complete logic package includes: * The logic textbook, Proof and Consequence *A very helpful study guide to the textbook, containing extra exercises, Simple Simon *Access, through Simon, to the grading software, Simon Says, that allows students to submit assignments and track their grades. (shrink)

Logic diagrams have been increasingly studied and applied for a few decades, not only in logic, but also in many other fields of science. The history of logic diagrams is an important subject, as many current systems and applications of logic diagrams are based on historical predecessors. While traditional histories of logic diagrams cite pioneers such as Leibniz, Euler, Venn, and Peirce, it is not widely known that Kant and the early Kantians in Germany and England played a crucial role (...) in popularising Euler(-type) diagrams. In this paper, the role of the Kantians in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries will be analysed in more detail. It shows that diagrams (or intuition in general) were a highly contentious topic that depend on the philosophical attitude and went beyond logic to touch on issues of physics, metaphysics, linguistics and, above all, mathematics. (shrink)

Eine der maßgeblichsten Kritiken an Heideggers Wahrheitskonzeption stammt von Ernst Tugendhat. Ihm zufolge gelangt Heidegger in Sein und Zeit zu einer Definition der Aussagewahrheit bzw. einem Wahrheitsbegriff, der das Spezifische des Wahrheitsphänomens zum Verschwinden bringt. Dieser Interpretation hat Carl Friedrich Gethmann wiederholt widersprochen. Heidegger halte an Husserls Begriff der Aussagewahrheit fest und da, wo Tugendhat eine unberechtigte Erweiterung des Wahrheitsbegriffs ausmache, gehe es Heidegger nicht mehr um den Begriff der Aussagewahrheit, sondern um die Voraussetzungen des Wahrheitsbegriffs. Demnach liege keine (...) Erweiterung, sondern ein äquivoker Gebrauch des Begriffs vor. Wie der Beitrag erstens zeigt, kann Gethmanns Lesart als eine konsistente Alternative vertreten werden. Zweitens wird aber auch gezeigt, daß es für Tugendhat naheliegt, die Äquivokation als Erweiterung zu betrachten, da er nach ihrem sachlichen Gehalt fragt. Anhand der Diskussion der These von der Abkünftigkeit des apophantischen aus dem hermeneutischen Als und Gethmanns Deutung dieses Zusammenhangs wird schließlich deutlich, warum Tugendhat zu Recht davon ausgeht, das Spezifische des Wahrheitsbegriffs könne aus der Konzeption der Erschlossenheit nicht hergeleitet werden. (shrink)

Ein Beispiel für die Rezeption und Fortführung der schopenhauerschen Logik findet man in den Mathematiklehrbüchern Friedrich Adolph Wilhelm Diesterwegs (1790–1866), In diesem Aufsatz werden die historische und systematische Dimension dieser Anwendung von Logikdiagramme auf die Mathematik skizziert. In Kapitel 2 wird zunächst die frühe Rezeption der schopenhauerschen Logik und Philosophie der Mathematik vorgestellt. Dabei werden einige oftmals tradierte Vorurteile, die das Werk Schopenhauers betreffen, in Frage gestellt oder sogar ausgeräumt. In Kapitel 3 wird dann die Philosophie der Mathematik und (...) der Logik Schopenhauers vorgestellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Schopenhauers Logikdiagramme auf Ideen der Mathematiker Leonhard Euler (1707–1783), Bernhard Friedrich Thibaut (1775–1832) und Franz Ferdinand Schweins (1780–1856) zurückgehen und dass Schopenhauer diese Logikdiagramme auch bereits zur Analyse mathematischer Begriffe verwendet. Kapitel 4 beschäftigt sich mit der Schopenhauer-Rezeption Diesterwegs. Es wird die Frage behandelt, inwieweit Diesterweg in der Mathematik von Schopenhauer beeinflusst war und welche Rolle dieser Einfluss auf sein Verständnis von Logik und Mathematik hatte. In Kapitel 5 wird schließlich gezeigt, dass Diesterweg die schopenhauersche Begriffsanalyse der Mathematik mit Hilfe von Logikdiagrammen aufgreift und weiterführt. Da Diesterweg einer der einflussreichsten Pädagogen und Mathematikdidaktiker des 20. Jahrhunderts war, ist anzunehmen, dass sich Spuren dieser Methode noch heute finden lassen. Inwiefern dies wahrscheinlich ist, wird in der Zusammenfassung (Kapitel 6) thematisiert. (shrink)

Ideology and politics were among the dynamics that shaped the scholarly reception of Friedrich Hölderlin and his work from the 1920s to 1940s. By taking the examples of research reports by Adolf von Grolman, Johannes Hoffmeister, and Heinz Otto Burger as well as of the controversy between Wilhelm Böhm and Ludwig Strauß, we outline the reciprocal function of Hölderlin and the DVjs. In doing so, we specifically focus on Paul Kluckhohn’s role in Hölderlin research, not only as an editor (...) but also as a public speaker and academic promoter in politically turbulent times. (shrink)

Das Buch zeichnet Schopenhauers individualistisches Rechtsdenken nach und verteidigt seinen methodischen Individualismus namentlich gegen Carl Schmitt. Soweit ersichtlich erstmals wird Schopenhauers Idee der ewigen Gerechtigkeit der Kritik Friedrich Nietzsches gegenübergestellt.

Around 1800, Johann Gottlieb Fichte's primary circle of recipients consisted not only of philosophers, but above all of theologians, religiously engaged laymen, educators, writers and caricaturists, medical practitioner, civil servants and lawyers. The entire reception in post-Kantian philosophy is limited to the years between 1792 and 1810. This period can be divided into two phases: namely the phase up to 1799, in which Fichte acquired students and followers, and the phase from 1799 onwards, in which Fichte's reception was related to (...) the atheism controversy. The discussion about Fichte began to wane in 1810, so that Beneke even claimed in 1833 that Fichte's philosophy "must be regarded as completely lost". Among others, the paper reports on Fichte's disciples such as August Ludwig Hülsen, Johann Gottfried Immanuel Berger, Johann Baptist Schad and sympathisers of Fichte such as Johann Christian Gottlieb Schaumann, Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, Gottlieb Ernst Mehmel, and Johann Neeb. (shrink)

The German theologian and philosopher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, is important in hermeneutic history for at least two reasons. First, he initiated the transition of hermeneutics from rule‐governed interpretation in particular disciplines‐such as theology, law, and philology‐to a comprehensive analysis of human understanding as such. Second, he is not only the father of general hermeneutics, but also of modern theology. In developing his hermeneutic principles, Schleiermacher steers a middle path between the rationalist Enlightenment interpreters, and the historical‐critical philologists. The (...) third extreme he eschews is dogmatic biblical exegesis that, when it emphasizes the text's divine inspiration, results in disregard for historical particularity. Schleiermacher's hermeneutics tries to integrate the pre‐given ontological structures of language that shape an author's mind with the spiritual element. Every linguistic expression contains both the objective structural and subjective psychological aspects, which require the interpreter's corresponding grammatical (or comparative) and divinatory (or psychological) skills for determining meaning. (shrink)

Das folgende Essay erläutert, warum der Tod Gottes sowohl in einem konsequent theistischen System als auch bei atheistischen Denkern unausweichlich ist. Zur Beantwortung der Frage, wie Gott gestorben ist, werden hauptsächlich Autoren wie Friedrich W. Schelling , Friedrich Nietzsche und Peter Sloterdijk herangezogen. Da die Rede vom Tod Gottes den Verdacht erweckt, metaphorisch zu sein, werden wir mit Apoptose und Nekrose auch zwei unterschiedliche Metaphern anwenden, um den vorliegenden Sachverhalt zu beschreiben . Das letzte Kapitel fragt dann nach (...) den Konsequenzen von Gottes Tod für die heutige Ethik.The following essay describes the death of god as unavoidable in a consequent theistic as well as in an atheistic system. To answer the question: how god died, philosophers like Friedrich W. Schelling , Friedrich Nietzsche und Peter Sloterdijk were taken into consideration. For the matter of god’s death is suggestive of being metaphorical, we use two different metaphors to discuss the issue – apoptosis and necrosis . Finally the last chapter asks for the consequences of god’s death concerning nowadays ethics. (shrink)

Bestimmung des Begriffs „Person”. Vorkommen und Beispiele der Inkongruenz von morphologischer, physiologischer und psychischer Einheit . Person und Persönlichkeit. Begriff der übergeordneten psychischen Person und der in diese einbezognen psychischen Personen. Wechselbeziehungen zwischen beiderlei bei Tier und Mensch. Dem geläufigen Wissen entnommene Beispiele. Besonders instruktive Zustände und Vorkommnisse im tierischen Verhalten , welche die Existenz von Mehrfachpersonalität belegen, darunter mannigfache Wechselbeziehungen zwischen einer übergeordneten Person und einbezognen wie unter solchen, werden in diesem Sinn neu gedeutet. Sie betreffen Medusen, Actinien, Hydren, (...) Asteroideen, Crinoideen, Turbellarien, Poriferen, Protisten, nach Beobachtungen am naturgegebnen Verhalten, Experimenten, operativen Verfahren vonGoetsch, Diebschlag, Jennings, von Levetzow, W. Arndt. Aus der Humanpsychologie gehört in diesen Zusammenhang u.a. die Problematik um das uns „Unbewusste” und damit um das hier bevorzugte Wesen des Erinnerungsvorgangs. Mehrdeutigkeit von „bewusst, unbewusst, unterbewusst”, Ablehnung aller Schichtenvorstellungen über Psychisches, Ablösung durch meinen hier dargelegten Personalismus. Wahrhaft unbewusst sind uns die Triebdispositionen bezw. Instinktbereitschaften, nebstdem die Fertigkeiten und Reaktionsmechanismen und die uns erinnerlich entfallenen Bewustseinsinhalte. Erklärung dieses Unbewussten aus der Mitwirkung einbezogner psychischer Personen. Rolle dieser Bewahrer beim Erwerb, der Bewahrung, der Rückerstattung an das „Bewusstsein” u.a. Mangel jeder Initiative bei den einbezognenen Erinnernsbewahrern, somit auch jeder Art eines „tätigen Unbewussten” vom Typ des „Unterbewusstseins” des Psychanalytiker. Art der somatischen Repräsentation der Erinnernsbewahrer. Im Punkt des Verhältnisses der Bewahrer zu den durch sie bewahrten Inhalten erfordert der Standpunkt einer reinen Psychologie, jene sich als ihrer Inhalte bewusst vorzustellen. Kritik an einigen voraussichtlich gegen meine personale Auffassung vom Erinnerungsvorgang sich richtenden Bedenken. Vergleich meiner Theoretik hinsichtlich des Erinnernsvorgangs mit andern, die ihr verwandt sind oder verwandt erscheinen können: Ablehnung der materialisierenden Hypothetik in der „Physiologischen Psychologie”Theodor Ziehens, - Anerkennung beachtlicher Ansätze beiOswald Bumke, seine Annäherung in Wesentlichem, so in seiner Ablehnung eines tätigen Unbewussten , - ohne dass er zur Vorstellung der einbezognen Personen und einer damit ermöglichten Deutung dieser Vorgänge gelangte. Einwände gegen Einzelheiten bei ihm. (shrink)

Bringing together leading figures in the study of international relations, this collection explores praxis as a perspective on international politics and law. It builds on the transdisciplinary work of Friedrich Kratochwil to reveal the scope, limits and blind spots of praxis theorizing.

The stakes associated with an algorithmic decision are often said to play a role in determining whether the decision engenders a right to an explanation. More specifically, “high stakes” decisions are often said to engender such a right to explanation whereas “low stakes” or “non-high” stakes decisions do not. While the overall gist of these ideas is clear enough, the details are lacking. In this paper, we aim to provide these details through a detailed investigation of what we will call (...) the “Simple Stakes Thesis”. The Simple Stakes Thesis, as it will turn out, is too simple. For even if the stakes associated with a specific one-off decision are low—and hence does not engender a right to an explanation—such decisions may nevertheless form part of a high stakes pattern or aggregate of decisions. In such cases, we argue, even a low stakes decision may engender a right to explanation. Not only does this show that the right to explanation is more demanding than so far recognized. It also shows that the stakes thesis is significantly harder to apply in practice. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forward two novel arguments against the counterfactual comparative account (CCA) of harm and benefit. In both arguments, the central theme is that CCA conflicts with plausible judgements about benefit and prudence.

This book offers a critical update of current Wittgenstein research on the Tractatus logico-philosophicus (TLP) and its relation to the Vienna Circle. The contributions are written by renowned Wittgenstein scholars, on the occasion of the "Wittgenstein Years" 1921/1922 with a special focus on its origin, reception, and interpretation then and now. The main topic is the mutual relation between Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (esp. Schlick, Waismann, Carnap, Gödel), but also Russell and Ramsey. In addition, included in this volume are (...) new studies on Wittgenstein's life and work, on the philosophy of the TLP, and on the Wittgenstein family in philosophical and historical context. Furthermore, unpublished documents on Wittgenstein and Waismann from the archives are provided in form of edited and commented primary sources. As per the book series' usual format, a general part of this Yearbook covers a study on Neurath's economy as well as reviews of related publications. (shrink)

In this paper, we give a new argument for the existence of moral luck. The argument is based on a manipulation case in which two agents both lack second-order control over their actions, but one of them has first-order control. Our argument is, we argue, in several respects stronger than standard arguments for moral luck. Five possible objections to the argument are considered, and its general significance for the debate on moral luck is briefly discussed.

This paper concerns the double standard debate in the ethics of AI literature. This debate essentially revolves around the question of whether we should subject AI systems to different normative standards than humans. So far, the debate has centered around the desideratum of transparency. That is, the debate has focused on whether AI systems must be more transparent than humans in their decision-making processes in order for it to be morally permissible to use such systems. Some have argued that the (...) same standards of transparency should be applied across the board, for AI systems and humans alike. Others have argued that we should hold AI systems to higher standards than humans in terms of transparency. In this paper, we first point out that there are structurally similar double standard debates to be had about other desiderata besides transparency, such as predictive accuracy. Second, we argue that when we focus on predictive accuracy, there are at least two reasons for holding AI systems to a lower standard than humans. (shrink)

Taboo terms offer a playground for linguistic creativity in language after language, and sign languages form no exception. The present paper offers the first investigation of taboo terms in sign languages from a cognitive linguistic perspective. We analyze the linguistic mechanisms that introduce offense, focusing on the combined effects of cognitive metonymy and iconicity. Using the Think Aloud Protocol, we elicited offensive or crass signs and dysphemisms from nine signers. We find that German Sign Language uses a variety of linguistic (...) means to introduce and enhance offense, many of which rely on iconic properties of the taboo sign. In conjunction with cross-linguistically common metonymic word-formation strategies, the degree of visual explicitness of a sign increases its potential to offend. Semantically similar taboo signs based on the same metonymic anchor but differing in their degree of iconicity also differ in offensiveness. This allows for creating dysphemisms and euphemisms via phonological changes to a sign. We further show that embodiment creates modality-enhanced ‘vicarious embarrassment’ in the viewer that results in the respective signs being judged obscene or offensive. Further, lexical blending and non-manual enhancement play a role in the creation of dysphemisms in DGS. Lastly, we propose that iconicity as a cognitive structuring principle of linguistic expressions constrains the possible semantic extensions of iconic taboo terms. (shrink)

According to the “deprivation approach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman (inspired by Thomas Nagel) and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly (...) different from death. This paper criticizes these responses. (shrink)

Political economy and economic sociology have developed in relative isolation from each other. While political economy focuses largely on macro phenomena, economic sociology focuses on the embeddedness of economic action. The article argues that economic sociology can provide a microfoundation for political economy beyond rational actor theory and behavioral economics. At the same time political economy offers a unifying research framework for economic sociology with its focus on the explanation of capitalist dynamics. The sociological microfoundation for understanding of capitalist dynamics (...) should focus on the expectations actors have regarding future states of the world. Based on a discussion of what I call the four Cs of capitalism, I argue that under conditions of uncertainty, expectations are contingent and should be understood as “fictional expectations.” The capability of humans to imagine future states of the world that can be different from the present is the central basis for a sociological microfoundation of the dynamics of economic macro phenomena. Macroeconomic dynamics are anchored in these “fictional expectations,” which create motifs for engaging in potentially profitable but ultimately incalculable outcomes. This shifts attention to the “management of expectations” as a crucial element of economic activity and to the institutional, political, and cultural foundations of expectations. The reproduction of capitalism is precarious also because of the contingency of expectations conducive to its growth. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is, to tentatively sketch and try defend some observations regarding the ontological dignity of object references, as they may be used from within in a formalized language. -/- Hence I try to explore, what properties objects are presupposed to have, in order to enter the universe of discourse of an interpreted formalized language. -/- First I review Frege′s analysis of the logical structure of truth value definite sentences of scientific colloquial language, to draw suggestions from (...) his saturated vs. unsaturated sentence components paradigm. -/- Next try investigate, in how far reference to non pure math objects might allow for a role as argument of a truth value function. Object kinds to be considered are: common sense objects, technical objects, humanities object kinds (social, psychical, ...), objects of art, ... , be they abstract, concrete, or in this respect mixed objects. -/- Then have a comment on the just referenced label abstract objects. -/- Next try to get an idea wrt the ontological significance of the fact, that pure math objects and functions in some important classical cases can be uniquely defined by means of categorical theories. Here, in the course of my argument, I have a little corollary wrt the standard model of first order Peano arithmetic, reducing the epistemological significance of the existence of the non standard models. -/- Next, wrt a special concept of a formalized empirical theory, I care for whether the impure math objects and mixed objects described here, and complying best with truth value function mapping, are also reliable candidates for the ontological commitment of such theories: and discuss an alternative, which reduces the ontological significance of the universe of discourse of the theories intended models. -/- In the end I sum up what is - from my point of view - the status quo, according to my respective findings. (shrink)

In this article I discuss the question of whether a person’s existence can be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence. Recently, Nils Holtug and Melinda A. Roberts have defended an affirmative answer. These defenses, I shall argue, do not succeed. In different ways, Holtug and Roberts have got the metaphysics and axiology wrong. However, I also argue that a person’s existence can after all be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence, though for reasons other than those (...) provided by Holtug and Roberts. (shrink)

The philosopher and historian of culture Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) has had a significant and continuing influence on twentieth-century Continental philosophy and in a broad range of scholarly disciplines. This volume is the third to be published in Princeton University Press's projected six-volume series of his most important works. Part One makes available three of his works on hermeneutics and its history: "Schleiermacher's Hermeneutical System in Relation to Earlier Protestant Hermeneutics" (The Prize Essay of 1860); "On Understanding and Hermeneutics" (1867-68), based (...) on student lecture notes, and the "The Rise of Hermeneutics" (1900), which traces the history of hermeneutics back to Hellenistic Greece. All the addenda to this well-known essay are translated here, some for the first time. In them Dilthey articulates three philosophical aporias concerning hermeneutics and projects an ultimate convergence between understanding and explanation. Part Two provides translations of review essays by Dilthey on Buckle's use of statistical history and on Burckhardt's cultural history; an essay "Friedrich Schlosser and the Problem of Universal History;" and a talk recalling his early years as a student of Boeckh, Jakob Grimm, Mommsen, Ranke, and Ritter. It also contains the important historical essay "The Eighteenth Century and the Historical World," in which Dilthey reexamines the Enlightenment to show its significant contributions to the rise of historical consciousness. (shrink)

In a recent article, I criticized Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s influential argument—appealing to the rationality of our asymmetric attitudes towards past and future pleasures—against the Lucretian claim that death and prenatal non-existence are relevantly similar. Brueckner and Fischer have replied, however, that my critique involves an unjustified shift in temporal perspectives. In this paper, I respond to this charge and also argue that even if it were correct, it would fail to defend Brueckner and Fischer’s proposal against (...) my critique. (shrink)

Derek Parfit famously defends a number of surprising views about "fission." One is that, in such a scenario, it is indeterminate whether I have survived or not. Another is that the fission case shows that it does not matter, in itself, whether I survive or not. Most critics of the first view contend that fission makes me cease to exist. Most opponents of the second view contend that fission does not preserve everything that matters in ordinary survival. In this paper (...) I shall provide a critique that does not rely on either of these contentions. There are other, interrelated reasons to reject Parfit's defense of the two theses. In particular, the availability of the following view creates trouble for Parfit: I determinately survive fission, but it is indeterminate which fission product I am. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Eli Pitcovski puts forward a novel, explanation-based account of harm. We seek to show that Pitcovski’s account, and his arguments in favor of it, can be substantially improved. However, we also argue that, even thus improved, the account faces a dilemma. The dilemma concerns the question of what it takes for an event, E, to explain why a state, P, does not obtain. Does this require that P would have obtained if E had (...) not occurred? Pitcovski’s theory faces problems no matter how one answers that question. (shrink)

One increasingly popular approach to personal identity is called ‘animalism.’ Unfortunately, it is unclear just what the doctrine says. In this paper, I criticise several different ways of stating animalism, and put forward one formulation that I find more promising.

1. Bosanquet, who relished paradox, does not disappoint us about history. The late nineteenth century was a golden age of historical inquiry. Historians — Ernst Curtius, J.G. Droysen, Theodor Mommsen in Germany, William Stubbs, E.A. Freeman and F.W. Maitland in England, Jules Michelet and others in France — were establishing history as a credible and esteemed academic discipline. This increasing respectability of the practice of history was matched by a sophisticated theorisation of history, a theorisation which took two directions. (...) On the one hand were Marx’s brilliant and bewitching historical projections. On the other the logic and methodology of history as an autonomously valid form of knowledge and inquiry were being elaborated. This last was largely a process in which the hermeneutic inquiries of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Droysen and Wilhelm von Humboldt came to fruition in the work of such writers as Philip August Boeckh, Wilhelm Dilthey and — not to forget The Presuppositions of Critical History — our own F.H. Bradley. (shrink)

The philosopher and historian of culture Wilhelm Dilthey has had a significant and continuing influence on twentieth-century Continental philosophy and in a broad range of scholarly disciplines. This volume is the third to be published in Princeton University Press's projected six-volume series of his most important works. Part One makes available three of his works on hermeneutics and its history: "Schleiermacher's Hermeneutical System in Relation to Earlier Protestant Hermeneutics" ; "On Understanding and Hermeneutics", based on student lecture notes, and the (...) "The Rise of Hermeneutics", which traces the history of hermeneutics back to Hellenistic Greece. All the addenda to this well-known essay are translated here, some for the first time. In them Dilthey articulates three philosophical aporias concerning hermeneutics and projects an ultimate convergence between understanding and explanation. Part Two provides translations of review essays by Dilthey on Buckle's use of statistical history and on Burckhardt's cultural history; an essay "Friedrich Schlosser and the Problem of Universal History;" and a talk recalling his early years as a student of Boeckh, Jakob Grimm, Mommsen, Ranke, and Ritter. It also contains the important historical essay "The Eighteenth Century and the Historical World," in which Dilthey reexamines the Enlightenment to show its significant contributions to the rise of historical consciousness. (shrink)

The epistemic arrow of time is the fact that our knowledge of the past seems to be both of a different kind and more detailed than our knowledge of the future. Just like with the other arrows of time, it has often been speculated that the epistemic arrow arises due to the second law of thermodynamics. In this paper, we investigate the epistemic arrow of time using a fully formal framework. We begin by defining a memory system as any physical (...) system whose present state can provide information about the state of the external world at some time other than the present. We then identify two types of memory systems in our universe, along with an important special case of the first type, which we distinguish as a third type of memory system. We show that two of these types of memory systems are time-symmetric, able to provide knowledge about both the past and the future. However, the third type of memory systems exploits the second law of thermodynamics, at least in all of its instances in our universe that we are aware of. The result is that in our universe, this type of memory system only ever provides information about the past. We also argue that human memory is of this third type, completing the argument. We end by scrutinizing the basis of the second law itself. This uncovers a previously unappreciated formal problem for common arguments that try to derive the second law from the “Past Hypothesis”, i.e., from the claim that the very early universe was in a state of extremely low entropy. Our analysis is indebted to prior work by one of us but expands and improves upon this work in several respects. (shrink)

This book examines the conceptual and temporal frames through which modern Western historiography has linked itself to classical antiquity. In doing so, it articulates a genealogical problematic of what history is and a more strictly focused reappraisal of Greek and Roman historical thought. Ancient ideas of history have played a key role in modern debates about history writing, from Kant through Hegel to Nietzsche and Heidegger, and from Friedrich Creuzer through George Grote and Theodor Mommsen to Momigliano and (...) Moses Finley; yet scholarship has paid little attention to the theoretical implications of the reception of these ideas. The essays in this collection cover a wide range of relevant topics and approaches and boast distinguished authors from across Europe in the fields of classics, ancient and modern history and the theory of historiography. (shrink)

“Dialectic” has been a matter of growing interest in contemporary philosophy. The present article analyzes dialectical methods and positions them by reference to two paradigmatic texts of German idealism and analytic philosophy, i.e. J.G. Fichte’s Science of Knowing (1804) and J. McDowell’s Mind and World. Both dialectical approaches will be interpreted with regard to their contribution in the debate on reductionism and anti-reductionism: both Fichte and McDowell claim that philosophical positions and logical terms stand in a dualistic relationship to one (...) another, on the one hand, but are separated by a gulf, on the other. I will argue that for McDowell dialectic seems to be an alternative to one-sided reductionisms as well as to normal anti-reductionistic holism. Furthermore, for Fichte dialectic is an adequate method for describing the relationship of reductionism and anti-reductionism itself. Both see in dialectic a technique for bridging the gulf between binary opposite terms of logic as well as mutually exclusive positions, such as mind and world, subject and object, or idealism and realism. (shrink)